We look at the effect of religiosity on social trust, defined as the share of a population that thinks that people in general can be trusted. We make use of new data from the Gallup World Poll for 105 countries and 43 U.S. states, measuring religiosity by the share of the population that answers yes to the question "Is religion an important part of your daily life?" Our empirical results indicate a robust, negative and causal effect of religiosity, both internationally and within the U.S. The size of this effect increases with the degree of religious diversity.
Introduction
Social trust refers to trust in people in general and is related to many desired economic and political outcomes, such as higher economic growth (Knack and Keefer, 1997; Zak and Knack, 2001; Berggren et al., 2008) , higher education (Bjørnskov, 2009a; Papagapitos and Riley, 2009) , better governance (Bjørnskov, in press; Knack, 2002) , higher democratic stability (Uslaner, 2003) , smaller underground economies (D'Hernoncourt and Méon, 2008) , and higher rates of subjective wellbeing (Helliwell, 2006) . Consequently, a central question is why the populations in some countries and states are more trusting than in others.
This question has spurned a vibrant literature on social trust (e.g., Delhey and Newton, 2005; Brown and Uslaner, 2005; Berggren and Jordahl, 2006) . Many variables have been suggested as determinants, including income inequality, ethnic diversity, welfare state policies, legal quality, economic development, democracy, having a communist history, and hierarchical religions. However, only a few variables have turned out to be robustly associated with trust (Bjørnskov, 2007; Nannestad, 2008) . The search for good explanations of the vast trust differences across countries and states continues, as does the debate between different schools of thought on what to look for. 
Previous studies
Earlier empirical studies on the relationship between religion and trust can be divided into three groups. A first group consists of cross-country studies of the determinants of trust and has included measures of the share of the population belonging to hierarchical religions, by which is meant the Catholic Church, Islam, and Orthodox churches, or some other religions. 4 The effect of hierarchical religions is generally found to be negative (La Porta et al., 1997; Zak and Knack, 2001; Berggren and Jordahl, 2006; Bjørnskov, 2007) ; there are some signs of a positive effect of Protestantism (Uslaner, 2002; Guiso et al., 2003; Delhey and Newton, 2005) , although one study finds no statistically significant effect (Bjørnskov, 2007) . However, the latter study does identify a positive effect of Hinduism and Buddhism in some specifications. Lastly, looking at beliefs, McCleary and Barro (2006) find no statistically significant effect of belief in heaven, hell or an afterlife on trust.
A second group of studies are based on individual-level data. Among them, Alesina and La Ferrara (2002) find no statistically significant effect of religious affiliation on trust; likewise, Welch et al. (2007) find no clear evidence of an association between religiosity, as measured by frequency of prayer, activity in religious congregations and beliefs in absolute morality and the "sinfulness of human nature", and trust. Welch et al. (2004) report that affiliation with Christian churches is related to lower trust, except for those who participate a lot and who report that religion is important, where a positive effect is found. Brañas-Garza et al. (2009) report that Catholic affiliation and observance is positively associated with trust among Latin
Americans. In line with some cross-country studies, results in Traunmüller (2009a,b) suggest that church attendance among German Protestants is associated with higher levels of trust.
A third group of studies are also based on individual-level data but are experimental. Anderson and Mellor (2007) test whether religious affiliation and participation are associated with behavior in public goods and trust games and find that the former is unrelated to individual behavior and that the latter has some mild effects. In public goods games, voluntary contributions increased with religious participation, and in certain trust games, individuals with the highest participation rates were both less trusting and more trustworthy. Tan (2006) finds no effect of religion on other-regarding behavior in ultimatum and dictator games conducted in Germany. Tan and Vogel (2008) report that religious trustees are trusted more, especially by religious trusters. Johansson-Stenman et al. (2009) find, for rural Bangladesh, that Muslims and Hindus trust people of their own religion more than they trust others and that Muslims are relatively more distrustful of Hindus, thus suggesting a role for religious diversity.
Theoretical arguments
Turning to the theoretical reasons to expect an association between religiosity and trust, Orbel et al. (1992) report that many seem to think that religion exerts a positive influence on trust: in particular, religious persons are thought to be more cooperative in a prisoners' dilemma experiment. And indeed, there are arguments for a positive effect on trust, mainly based on the idea that religions generally encourage adherents to do well unto others. But there are also arguments for a negative effect, mainly based on the idea that religiosity may create divides between the religious and the non-religious. In the following, we take a closer look at possible arguments.
A positive effect. Religion seems able to influence behavior in various ways. For instance, Iannaccone (1998) surveys studies that document a relationship between religion and criminal activity, drug and alcohol consumption, physical and mental health, and incidence and stability of marriage patterns and argues for a causal effect; Berggren (1997) finds that religious involvement is negatively related to abortion rates, the rate of children born out of wedlock, divorce rates and rates of not paying bills on time; and Putnam (2000) finds signs of religiously active individuals being more involved in donations to charity and volunteering. Effects of these kinds could arise because of the religious teachings and because of the social interaction that religiosity often entails.
As for teachings, many religions urge their followers to adhere to an ethics of reciprocity and generosity toward others. In Judaism, through Hillel ("Do not do to others what would be hateful if done to you"), and in Christianity, through Luke 6:31 ("Do unto others as you would have them do unto you"), this is embedded in the Golden Rule. Likewise, in Islam, Mohammed's farewell sermon includes the assertion "Hurt no one so that no one may hurt you." 5 Religion may, in this way, make use of or stimulate social or altruistic preferences (see Fehr and Fischbacher, 2002; Levitt and List, 2007) . Furthermore, religions often prohibit socially destructive behavior, such as cheating or stealing. To the extent that people believe that religious persons adhere to these teachings, such persons are probably perceived as more trustworthy, which may in turn induce trust.
It is not only the case that religions urge their followers to follow these teachings -the teachings may be internalized, not least due to conscious efforts to influence children, but are in any case generally enforced, which should make religious people seem even more trustworthy. Enforcement can be undertaken by other devotees or, at least in the minds of the religious, by some deity or cosmic system of justice. For example, many religious groups uphold strict behavioral codes and discipline and ostracize those who break them -for the logic of such rules, see Iannaccone (1992) -and people who behave badly may end up in hell or be reborn as some being with lower consciousness.
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As for social interaction, Ruffle and Sosis (2007) argue that collective rituals serve a useful purpose in stimulating social cohesion and a more favorable attitude toward cooperation. This could also extend to the non-religious. Furthermore, Demerath (2003, 348) states that "at the micro level, religion can foster a sense of 'social capital' by giving its lay participants practice in, and encouragement for, participating in wider social and political, whether as mere voters or as intense activists."
To summarize, decency and honesty towards other people is taught by almost all religions, which may make the religious more trusting. Also, there are social stimulants and enforcement mechanisms that could render it credible that the religiously devout are more trustworthy, which could induce trust from the nonreligious, in all, implying a positive religiosity-trust relationship.
A negative effect. Negative effects could come about in two different ways: by how religiosity affects the religious and by how religiosity affects the non-religious. First, religion may create a divide in society, if those who believe consider others wicked or at least ignorant of and less prone to adhere to important moral insights. 7 After all, the non-believers are not subjected to the same moral teachings, to the same internalization mechanisms, to the same enforcement mechanisms (be it social or divine) or to the same social interaction. To the extent that the religious trust others, then, this could primarily be restricted to their own group, as noted by Uslaner (2002) . Smith et al. (1998, ch. 4 Religiosity could influence trust negatively in a second major way, through its effects on the nonreligious, who may react to increased religiosity in a way that reduces social trust. The non-religious may consider the religious strange or different, and they may think that they behave well only so long as they expect to get social or divine rewards for doing so, i.e., that honest behavior is not rooted in moral so much as in self-interested motives. 10 This is in line with the theoretical discussion in Alesina and La Ferrara (2002) , in which people trust those who are "similar" to them (and to the non-religious, the religious may seem dissimilar) and where trust is lower in communities with religious heterogeneity.
Reverse causality and the Club and Welfare hypotheses. We also need to ask whether there could be a reverse causal relationship, i.e., one of trust increasing or reducing religiosity, or if other variables may be involved, perhaps jointly causing religiosity and trust. As for trust increasing religiosity, one could imagine the possibility of trusting people being more open to the messages of others. Since some religions try to recruit new followers, they could be more successful in a setting of high trust (although perhaps other teachings, including atheism, could be accepted as easily). As for an effect in the opposite direction, higher trust in one's fellow human beings could reduce the felt need for religion. To some extent, trust in a nonreligious setting could therefore substitute for some of the perceived benefits of joining a community of social care and of strict teachings that are enforced. Conversely, if individuals feel that other people cannot be trusted, religious beliefs may offer a refuge from an apparently immoral, unsafe and dangerous material world, as well as the comforts of rewards in an afterlife.
Building on this, there could be other variables involved -as expressed in the Club and Welfare hypotheses. 11 The former hypothesis states that ethnic homogeneity creates a "club" feeling of familiarity, 8 community and safety. This is associated with high trust, as people tend to trust those who are similar to themselves, and low religiosity, as the community provides the social goods otherwise supplied by religion, indicating a negative relationship. The latter hypothesis states that welfare-state spending leads to both higher trust, since large welfare states tend to be universal and perceived as fair (Kumlin and Rothstein, 2005) , and lower religiosity (Buchanan, 2005) , since the welfare state and religion are substitutes in the exercise of care of people. The two hypotheses thus suggest that ethnic homogenity and the size of the welfare state are underlying factors entailing both high trust and low religiosity and, hence, that religiosity does not exercise an original and causal effect on trust.
Summary. This theoretical discussion indicates that religiosity could stimulate or reduce trust -and that reverse causality, or causal effects from some other variables, could obtain. Clearly, the nature of the relationship must be settled empirically.
Data and empirical strategy
In order to estimate the association between religiosity and trust, we largely follow the methodology of the existing cross-country literature on the is the share of the population of a country or state which answers "yes" to the question "In general, do you think most people can be trusted or can't you be too careful?"
While the question may seem vague, a number of studies show that respondents perceive this question as a measure of trust in strangers or people in general and that it correlates well with other measures of nonenforceable but honest behavior (Knack and Keefer, 1997; Bjørnskov, 2007 Bjørnskov, , 2009b . Nannestad (2008) also notes that surprisingly few respondents -typically below five percent -in surveys refrain from answering the question; hence, even though the question may a priori seem vague, most people seem able to provide an unequivocal answer. Furthermore, both in-depth interviews in Uslaner (2002) , and the fact that the simple trust question predicts outcomes of trust experiments reasonably well when the stakes of properly anonymized games are of economic significance, suggest that the question measures trust in strangers, i.e., trust without specific information (Sapienza et al., 2007; Ostrom et al., 2009; Thöni et al., 2009 ). This is also most clearly indicated by recent research showing that social trust picked up by the standard question and questions specifically directed at measuring trust in family and close friends are constructs that are negatively associated (Alesina and Guiliano, in press).
For the cross-country comparisons, we use the average of all available and credible observations in the five waves of the World Values Survey, supplemented by data from the LatinoBarómetro, the AfroBarometer, the Asian and East Asia Barometers, and the Danish Social Capital Project; all of these surveys have asked the same trust question in approximately representative samples. 12 determinants of trust.
First, we use the standard trust measure, which
In our cross-state US comparison, we instead use the trust data in Brown and Uslaner (2005) , which primarily rest on the 1990s waves of the General Social Survey, supplemented by data from the American National Election Studies, and surveys by the Pew Research Center; the combination of these surveys brings the number of respondents in 43 states up to workable numbers.
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To get an impression of the differences, the international trust scores range from a low of 3.4 in Cape Verde, with almost similar scores in Trinidad and Tobago and Rwanda, to a well-known high above 60 percent in the Nordic monarchies (Denmark, Norway and Sweden). The range across the 43 U.S. states covered in the sample is a low of 10.5 (Arkansas) to a high of 63 percent (New Hampshire). As such, although the American average is much higher, the cross-state data are not substantially less variable than the cross-country data.
Second, our data on religiosity derive from Gallup (2007), who asked respondents "Is religion an important part of your daily life?" Our measure is the share of the population that answered "yes" to this question. While religiosity can be measured in multiple ways, we consider this question to capture the saliency of religion in everyday life, as argued in the preceding section. Finally, while we only use one variable to measure religiosity, it is worth emphasizing that it not only has the benefit of being available at two levels (cross-country and cross-state), the validity of the question as a measure of religiosity and strength of beliefs has been previously corroborated (Halman and Draulans 2006) .
Like the trust data, the religiosity variable also exhibits very large differences, both across the world and across the U.S. The least religious countries in the world, according to this question, are Estonia, Sweden and Denmark with scores below 20 percent, while the most religious are Bangladesh, Indonesia and Egypt, the latter with a score of 100 percent. The mean in the present sample is 67 percent while, in comparison, the U.S. mean is 64 percent. The least religious U.S. state is Vermont, which at 42 percent is roughly on par with Spain and Switzerland that form an OECD average. The most religious state, Mississippi, in which 85 percent of the population answered yes, is placed along countries such as India, El Salvador and Malaysia.
As such, the Gallup survey confirms that religion is, on average, substantially more important in the U.S.
than in most countries belonging to the Western hemisphere (Inglehart and Baker, 2000; McCleary and Barro, 2006; Pew, 2007) . 14 We follow the recent literature in our choice of control variables; all variables for both analyses are described, with descriptive statistics in Tables A3 and A4 and sources and definitions in Table A5 of the online Appendix. 15 In the cross-country analysis these variable include income inequality, controls for monarchies and postcommunist countries, a dummy for the Nordic countries (Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden) and the shares of the population belonging to either Catholicism, Islam, or an "Eastern" religion (Buddhism and Hinduism). We add these affiliation data in order to ensure that our results in the following are due to differences in religiosity, and not to differences in religious composition.
In further analysis, we add a measure of religious diversity. The measure derives from Alesina et al.
( 2003) and is calculated as one minus the Herfindahl-Hirschman index of the composition of religious affiliation in the population. 16 In other words, it is the probability that two members of a population, chosen at random, do not share the same religious affiliation. For the cross-country sample, we use the world religions to calculate this measure. The American data on religious affiliations provided by ARDA (2009) are more precise and distinguish between seven broad groups: Evangelical Protestants, Mainline Protestants, Orthodox Christians, Catholics, Mormons, other groups, and non-claimed individuals. Excluding nonclaimaints, we calculate the same measure of diversity for each of the U.S. states, based on this information.
In section 4.3, we interact these diversity measures with religiosity in order to test whether the effect of religiosity varies with the degree of religious diversity.
In the cross-state analysis, we follow the previous literature by including income inequality, the share of African-Americans in the state population, and controls for a set of different birth cohorts to take care of baby-boomer and WWII generational effects. In addition, we include a synthetic measure intended to capture the well-documented generational persistence of trust (Uslaner, 2008) . This measure, which we take from Bjørnskov (2009b) , is based on the implicit assumption that culturally transmitted trust may not have changed markedly since the major immigration waves in the 19th century. We take advantage of a question in the U.S. Census asking about respondents' family origins, i.e., which country the main part of their ancestors came from. The synthetic trust measure at the state level therefore is the weighted average of current trust in 100 countries identified in the U.S. Census (2008) as potential family origins; the weights are the shares of the state population identifying each of the countries as their family origin.
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Most results in the following are obtained by a two-stage least squares estimator in order to allow for the possibility that trust could affect religiosity, as outlined in section 2. We identify the causal effect by the use of instrumental variables that capture established correlates of religiosity. In the cross-country analysis, our instrumental variables are the logarithm to GDP per capita (measured in purchasing-power adjusted USD; baseline year is 2000) and a dummy for countries situated in North Africa or the Middle East, as this region is more religious than would be predicted by its GDP. The reason seems to be that oil and other resources constitute the main part of their production, which therefore does not reflect broader modernization trends. In the cross-state regressions, our instruments are the logarithm to gross state product per capita (measured in purchasing-power adjusted 2000 USD) and the state average voter turnout in presidential elections in the 1990s, which is known to correlate well with religiosity (Gerber, Gruber, and Hungermann 2008). While it could be argued that these instruments should correlate with the error terms of the regressions in the following, thus making them invalid, we throughout provide Hansen's J statistic to indicate that this is not the case.
In a set of additional robustness analyses, we split the cross-country sample in different ways. First, we present results that exclude observations with large residuals, observations in the top and bottom deciles of the trust distribution and, in an OLS regression, countries identified as outliers by Cook's D. Second, we present results for our religiosity variable when excluding deciles covering countries with low trust, high trust, low religiosity, high religiosity, Muslim, Catholic, Eastern religion, Orthodox, high incomes, low incomes and an unfree press. These tests, which we outline in more detail below, are made to ensure that results are not driven by countries with extreme data for our main variables.
Results
Before dealing with robustness and the causality issue, we start by exploring the bivariate correlations across the world and the U.S. states. That there is some association between religiosity and social trust is visible to the naked eye in both the cross-country sample in Fig. 1 and the cross-state sample in Fig. 2 . The simple correlations are -.52 in the former and -.57 in the latter.
Insert Fig. 2 about here
The test of a bivariate relation yields a surprisingly precise estimate of trust. In the cross-country sample, only 11 countries are more than 1.5 standard deviations off a simple regression line: Mongolia and
Trinidad and Tobago in a negative direction, while Canada, the Netherlands, Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden, Indonesia, Saudi Arabia and Thailand are substantially more trusting than the simple line suggests.
Likewise, only six U.S. states are more than 1.5 standard deviations off the line: Alaska, Arkansas and Delaware in a negative direction, and Utah and both Dakotas in a positive direction. Given the strongly indicative associations in these figures, we proceed to regression results.
Cross-country results
We start with the cross-country results, which we report in Table 2 . We first note that the effect of religiosity is negative and significant throughout. The bivariate estimate in column 1 is reduced somewhat when including a set of standard controls, but remains of approximately the same magnitude. We also note that the control variables exhibit the same results as in previous studies: income inequality is strongly significant and negative, Nordic countries are substantially more trusting than other countries, as are monarchies, while the populations in countries with a communist past are less trusting. Only the monarchy result fails once when we exclude the ten percent most trusting countries, among which monarchies are strongly overrepresented.
Insert Table 2 about here
The identifying assumption of our IV estimates is that economic development does not affect the variation of trust not captured by standard controls through other channels than religiosity. This may a priori seem like a quite restrictive assumption, yet we note that previous research tends to find the assumption plausible, and that its exclusion is practically unproblematic for our present purpose if measures of formal institutions (known to correlate with both GDP and trust) are only weakly correlated with religiosity (Murray 2006). We also note that all Hansen J statistics are insignificant; although the test associated with the simple bivariate association in column 1 is doubtful, this is due to variation picked up by control variables in the following columns. As such, we are far from rejecting the assumptions necessary for identifying causality.
Noting this, the results in Table 2 indicate that religiosity discourages trust, as measured at the national level. All other things being equal, the results suggest that moving from average religiosity (67 percent) to a Nordic level (20 percent) would be associated with, on average, an increase in trust of roughly 8-10 percentage points. Moreover, the inclusion of religiosity entirely swallows any clear effects of religious denominations found in previous studies (Berggren and Jordahl, 2006; Bjørnskov, 2007) ; the religion indicators fail being jointly significant by a large margin and thus provide no additional information (F = .89). Interestingly, the clear negative effect of having large shares of the population adhere to Islam in particular seems to be an effect of Muslim populations being much more religious than most other religions.
As such, Arab Muslims in particular come to reflect the hope often attributed to Muhammad: "An Arab is superior to a non-Arab in nothing but devotion" (quoted in Karsh, 2007, 19) .
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The main result proves to be robust to excluding outliers identified by two different methods in columns 3 and 6 -in the former by calculating residuals from 2SLS results, in the latter by Cook's Distance in OLS results -and to excluding the top and bottom ten percent of the sample, and as such estimating the effects in a range relevant to most countries. In Table A6 in the online Appendix, we experiment with another set of robustness tests, by excluding the top and bottom deciles of countries for trust, religiosity, economic development, predominant religion, and press freedom. While the size of our estimate of religiosity varies some, we note that it remains significant throughout.
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Given that Hansen's J statistic is never significant and very far from significance when excluding the most obvious outliers, we believe that the significant results can moreover be interpreted as a causal effect of religiosity on trust.
Cross-state results
However, one could still fear that international differences of religiosity simply capture other cultural features that are only spuriously correlated with the importance of religion in daily life. Another potential problem could arise if religiosity is primarily associated with trust in relatively poor countries, or if the negative effects do not pertain to Christian denominations. In order to make sure that these worries are unfounded, we therefore also estimate the importance in a cross-section of 43 U.S. states for which credible trust scores exist. This additional approach has a number of advantages.
First, the U.S. is a good laboratory for retesting cross-country findings, as the set-up of formal institutions and the overall political and popular culture is approximately the same across the country or, as a minimum, substantially less diverse than in cross-country samples. This alleviates the potential problems of omitted institutional and structural variables endemic to the cross-country literature. Likewise, the U.S. is to a very large extent dominated by Christianity, which allows us to sidestep the issue of more profound religious conflicts in society. It also provides a possibility to test whether the negative cross-country findings pertain to Christian religious affiliations, and not simply to other religions.
Second, in the U.S. sample, we have the opportunity to control for cultural differences determined by deep historical roots through creating a synthetic ancestral trust measure, following Bjørnskov (2009b). As outlined above, this measure is created as a weighted average of present-day trust levels in 100 countries from which Americans state that their ancestors came and is therefore likely to pick up effects deeply rooted in stable cultures. We note here that if religiosity also includes a component that is approximately stable across generations, the inclusion of ancestral trust is likely to lead us to underestimate the effects of religiosity on trust across the U.S. states, as part of the effect of religiosity in a historical perspective would be included in the synthetic measure of ancestral trust. The estimates in the following can therefore be seen as a lower bound of a "true" long-run effect.
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Our identifying assumptions behind the instrumental variables are similar to those in the cross-country analysis. In the cross-state analysis, we assume that GDP per capita and voter turnout in presidential elections do not affect trust through other channels than their association with religiosity. While both could in theoretically plausible ways be connected to trust, we note that Hansen's J statistic is quite far from significance when including all control variables. The estimates are therefore not likely to overestimate the effects of religiosity.
Insert Table 3 about here Table 3 reveals that the negative effect of religiosity on trust in the cross-country analysis remains negative when measured at the level of U.S. states. The IV estimates of columns 1-3 all display a negative association, as do the OLS estimates in columns 5-6, while the estimate in column 4, where the top and bottom deciles of the trust distribution are excluded, retains the negative sign but does not attain statistical significance. If one goes from the average level of religiosity (65 percent) to the lowest level (42 percent in Vermont), this entails an increased trust level of about five to ten percentage points; put differently, a one standard deviation shock to religiosity seems to produce a change in trust levels of about one third of a standard deviation.
A notable feature of our analysis is that income inequality, which otherwise is one of the most robust determinants of trust to be found in the literature, is insignificant throughout in our cross-state analysis. One explanation might be that religiosity could be antecedent to inequality. The share of blacks is negatively related to trust throughout, 21 while the cohort effects are generally significant, as is our synthetic ancestral trust variable: a higher degree of such trust increases trust by about the same amount, pointing at the possible importance of a cultural transmission of trust. The results are also robust to including dummies for Southern states and Coastal states.
We therefore note that the cross-state analysis broadly reproduces the findings from the cross-country analysis above: we consistently find that religiosity is negatively associated with trust. Furthermore, at both analytical levels, the size of the estimates is sufficient to warrant real attention.
Do effects vary with religious diversity?
Thus far, we have not considered the role of religious fractionalization or diversity. As explicated in section 2.2, there are theoretical reasons to expect a negative relationship between religiosity and trust to interact with the level of religious diversity. In a setting with many and different religious groups, higher religiosity plausibly entails more potential tension and distrust. This can stem from the attitudes of the religious towards other religious people, as well as towards the non-religious, and from the attitudes of the non-religious towards the religious. Table 4 illustrates the fruitfulness of exploring heterogeneity, i.e., of allowing the point estimate on religiosity to vary with religious diversity, a fractionalization measure from zero to one, which denotes the probability of two random people belonging to different religious groups. First, the difference between columns 1 and 2 (where the former just repeats results with the same sample) documents that religious diversity per se holds no explanatory power. However, including an interaction term in column 3 both boosts the explanatory power as well as providing clear evidence of a heterogeneous effect of religiosity, which is robust to excluding obvious outliers in column 4.
22 21 While Gustavsson and Jordahl (2008) find that the share of foreign-born persons in Swedish counties is related to lower trust, the vast majority of the present black population is born in the U.S. While the strong negative association between trust and the size of the black population therefore cannot be due to nationality, it may still be caused by having an easily identifiable population that also identifies itself outside of a national identity.
Insert Table 4 about here This relation is depicted in Fig. 3 , including the conditional 95 percent confidence interval, which clearly shows that the effect of religiosity on trust increases with the degree of religious diversity in society.
The level at which the effect turns negative is .22, or roughly the level in Argentina, Belgium or Denmark.
The effect turns significant at a level of approximately .35, which is about the level of India, Israel or Chile.
As such, 76 percent of the sample is above the cut-off, and 61 percent significantly so. As the distribution of the full sample of religious diversity in Alesina et al. (2003) is quite close to the one in our sample, the findings indicate that religiosity may be a problem for trust in between two-thirds and three-quarters of all countries in the world.
Insert Fig. 3 about here
As noted, we also develop a measure of religious diversity across the American states similar to the one used in our cross-country analysis. This allows us to repeat the analysis in section 4.2, including an interaction term between U.S. religiosity and the diversity measure. It furthermore allows us to test whether diversity between religious affiliations that are more closely related than religions in the cross-country sample has similar effects.
The results reported in Table 5 to a large extent replicate the findings in the cross-country sample.
While the estimated coefficients of the control variables are virtually unchanged and while diversity per se adds no explanatory power, the effect of religiosity appears clearly heterogeneous in religious diversity. This result is again robust to throwing out clear outlier observations. Like Fig. 3, Fig. 4 illustrates the heterogeneous relation, including the conditional 95 percent confidence interval. Although the estimate is never positive across the actual levels of diversity found in the US, religiosity fails statistical significance below a relatively low level around .35. This level is quite similar to the one found in the cross-country sample and approximately corresponds to religious diversity in states such as Michigan and Minnesota. As such, roughly three fourths of U.S. states have levels of religious fractionalization above this level.
Furthermore, the figure illustrates that the association between religiosity and trust fails the 5 percent significance level at very high levels of diversity, yet it still passes the 10 percent level.
Insert Table 5 about here Insert Fig. 4 about here
In summary, we find that religious diversity helps us to better pinpoint the relationship between religiosity and trust and to clarify that the tensions that are attributable to religious fractionalization contribute to explaining why there is a negative effect in most countries and U.S. states.
Testing the Club and Welfare hypotheses
Lastly, in order to get a firmer grasp of the mechanism at work behind our results, we investigate if they hold up when controlling for the variables suggested by the Club and Welfare hypotheses, outlined in section 2.2. More specifically, as shown in Table 6 , we include a measure of ethnic diversity, which captures the extent to which a country or state is not a homogeneous club, and two measures of government welfare.
In the cross-country sample, these are government expenditures as a share of GDP and total government transfer expenditure as a share of GDP, calculated as total revenue minus final consumption and military expenditures. For the cross-state sample, we use government final consumption per capita and government welfare consumption per capita.
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Insert Table 6 about here
As for the Club hypothesis, we find that ethnic diversity is positively related to trust and that religiosity (column 1) and the interaction between religiosity and religious diversity (column 4) retain their negative relation to trust in both samples. This suggests that religiosity exerts an independent effect on trust, given ethnic diversity. As for the Welfare hypothesis, we find that both variables (in columns 2, 3, 5, and 6) are negatively related to trust for both samples, but generally in a statistically insignificant way, whereas religiosity and the interaction between religiosity and religious diversity retain their influence. While they appear insignificant in the table, one should note that the point estimates are evaluated at a religious diversity level of zero. Contrary to this, the effect of religiosity remains highly significant as evaluated by the delta method at the sample mean (Brambor et al., 2006) . Looking at the effect size, the estimates of these main variables even increase when the additional welfare-state variables are added. 24 In all, we think the results indicate an independent and probably causal effect of religiosity on trust.
Conclusions
As trust has been shown to be important for the attainment of widely desired goals, such as economic growth, democratic stability and subjective well-being, the question of what stimulates trust constitutes a relevant research topic. We investigate the net effect of religiosity on trust, a topic that social scientists have recently begun to explore. Unlike the previous literature, we make use of a measure of religiosity that measures the share of a population for which (any) religion is important in their daily life, which we believe better captures "true" religiosity, excluding those members of religions and participants in religious events that are not believers and including those who are not members of established religion but who are nevertheless believers. We furthermore conduct our study on the basis of broader samples than before, in the form of a cross-country analysis covering more than 100 countries and a U.S. cross-state analysis.
Our results indicate that religiosity is negatively related to trust and that this result is robust to changing the sample in various ways. The use of instrumental variables suggest that the effect may be causal, and the results hold up when controlling for both ethnic diversity and welfare-state size, which have been proposed as underlying determinants of both trust and religiosity. The size of the estimates furthermore indicates importance. Going from an average degree or religiosity to the lowest degree at the cross-country level is related to an increase in trust by eight to ten percentage points. At the U.S. cross-state level, the marginal effect is, again, negative, but somewhat smaller. When deepening the analysis by interacting religiosity and the degree of religious fractionalization, we find that the effect turns negative above a low threshold level in both samples and that the relationship is monotonic.
On theoretical grounds, this result is not surprising, although there are also arguments for a possible positive relationship. The main reason to expect a negative effect, of the kind we have identified, is that religions may cause division and rift, both in that religious people may distrust those who do not share their beliefs and who are not subject to the same enforcement mechanisms as they are, and in that non-religious people may regard with suspicion those who take religiosity seriously. This seems to be the general case, in countries and states where there is moderate to high religious fractionalization.
A further question is if our results tell us something about whether some religions are more adverse to trust than others. While we in no way consider this an answer, the outliers which we identify by Cook's D provide a suggestion. These outliers are Indonesia, Japan, Mongolia and Thailand, two with substantially higher trust levels than would be predicted by our specification in Table 2 along with very high levels of religiosity (Indonesia and Thailand, +22 percent) and two with somewhat lower trust levels and relatively low levels of religiosity (Japan and Mongolia, -9 and -14 percent, respectively). These countries are also unified in having strongly Buddhist traditions, a religion without apparent secular meaning and a specific focus on peace and tolerance. Yet, whether Buddhism is different from other religions in this particular aspect is a question that we cannot provide an answer to here. Likewise, we cannot control for whether people adhere to particularly radical versions of some religion. These matters are topics for future research.
While we cannot say that religiosity always and everywhere causes reductions in trust, and while our findings do not imply that religiosity or religiously based traditions cannot have other, favorable effects (see Paldam, 2001) , it is quite clear that religiosity is not necessary for trust and that it, probably, has a detrimental effect, both internationally and in the US, especially when there is religious fractionalization. The belief and attendance figures measure how large a share of respondents interpret the bible literally and attend church at least once a week, respectively. The trust figures measure the share who state that most people can be trusted. Instrumental variables are the log to GDP per capita in 2000 and a dummy for North Africa and the Middle East. The outlier countries identified by Cook's D (residuals larger than 4/N) in column 6 are Indonesia, Japan, Mongolia and Thailand. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Instrumental variables are the log to GDP per capita in 2000 and the average voter turnout in presidential elections in the 1990s. The outlier states identified by Cook's D (residuals larger than 4/N) in column 6 are Delaware and Florida. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. The outlier countries identified by Cook's D (residuals larger than 4/N) in column 4 are Indonesia, Ireland, Japan, Morocco, Taiwan, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago and Turkey. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Interaction effects in column 3 are evaluated at a diversity level of zero; full results are illustrated in Fig. 4 . The four outlier states identified by Cook's D (residuals larger than 4/N) in column 4 are Delaware, Massachusetts, Florida and Utah. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. OLS. In all these regressions, the control variables used in Tables 5 and 6 have been employed. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
